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    In 1973, the Air Force prepares an historic CHECO report regarding the military installations in Thailand and the use of herbicides there.     All along, the VA/DOD are saying that there was only limited herbicide testing in the mid-60's and not even near "U.S. personnel."

    October 11, 2007   Thursday   6:00 am PST     DeployMed ResearchLink

    When is the government going to train its employees; sub-contractors
not to be confrontational?

    My objective was to give the DOD and indirectly, the VA notice of the use of herbicides in Thailand covering the period 1968 thru 1972.     For anonimity, we will refer to the government representative throughout this report as the "clerk."     And, the clerk evidently was accustomed to "taking the high ground," or neutralizing the caller's information with his form of silly intimidation.     Unfortunately, for the clerk, he has never met a Franco, the genuine brand.

"The name Agent Orange came from the orange stripe on the storage drum."

    When I told the clerk that herbicides were used in Thailand, he immediately responded "Agent Orange?" and I said "It doesn't matter."     He then attempted to imply that my reference to herbicides could very well be "Home Depot" brand weed killers, etc. that [we] use in our own yards.

Response:   "Right.   You keep that attitude of being adversarial here, and I will bury you."

Certain Herbicides ...

Unfortunately for this poor bastard, he evidently didn't read the above CFR for "service in Vietnam" and the reference to herbicides.     His loss.     I mean, who am I to correct a 20-year man; after all I only served 10?     And, as a government contractor to the DOD, he obviously has a superiority (complex) to me...

After that (diplomatic) comment, I had the clerk on the defense and I never relinquished the offense. *

    In fact, I took the opportunity to give him my (insulting) desertation on synonyms, ie, agent orange, pink, purple, white, toxins, herbs, herbicides .. you get my drift?     The clerk comes across as some junior schoolboy lawyer in a court of law attempting to pin the respondent down to his silly technical definition (of herbicides.)

* Never send a boy to do a man's job.     Send a gladiator.

    "[requested] DOD to provide the most current compilation of locations and dates where DOD used herbicide agents, including Agent Orange, as well as locations and dates where DOD personnel were likely exposed to these agents.     This information may be important in evaluating the merits of many veterans' disability claims."

Source:   VA AO Newsletter Article       Back Issues of the Newsletter

    Well, that's interesting.     It is permissible for the VA and/or DOD to refer to these deadly toxins as "agents" and/or "herbicides," but "little'ole me," you bet your ass!



    Now, I would be the last person to deny the government the right to hire military retirees that come with a large "suitcase" of preconceived preceptions and realize it is hard to find good help no matter what, but someone that is (supposedly) a position of official responsibility, contractor or employee, has got to learn to keep their opinions to themselves and not be confrontation over simple terminology.     Just think, if I was to direct the conversation into something really complicated.

    If the VA, themselves, are going to use these terms interchangeably, they've got to do a better job training these clerks -- especially where it affects disability claims!

"Environmental Hazards"

    In providing a succinct purpose of the Agent Orange Newsletter purpose, ie, communication the article goes even one step further a combines all these (potential) technical terms into one:   environment hazards.

    May be these same clerks that answer the phone in an official capacity shoud be required to read these newsletters.

Official AO Handbook

Definitions.


p.s.   I knew that, but evidently, our "super clerk" thought that the derivative "orange" had far reaching consequences versus a stripe on an industrial drum, and of course, the agent is part of a larger family of herbicides (or toxins.)     "[and] other service areas." -- exactly the purpose of my communication:   to notify the DOD (evidently via this contractor) DeployMed of the use in Thailand to be added to the official list (based upon official information, no less.)

"Four years since last published changes.."

    What was just as disturbing is that this list published by the DOD has not been updated for four years.    



Moving on ..

Holding my own, I asked him if he wanted a list of bases? He was flustered and really didn't respond to that repeated question at first.     Later, he conceded that the reference to "all military installations in Thailand except the immediate metro Bangkok area (of assignment) is conclusive enough."

USAF CHECO Report (Extract)
  SEA Declassifition & Review Team
"Releaseable Extract" 21 Sep 2007
.. 30 years after the War

Extract (of a report) means that, in this case, the AFDO (Air Force Declassification Office) and the AFOSI (Air Force Office of Special Investigations) at the Pentagon have released only parts of the report and the remainding parts are still classified, in 2007.     You may wonder why this is the case and there is no obvious answer.     If it wasn't for Kurt's FOIA, we probably wouldn't know what we know today.

What you can do ..

    Please call the 800 phone no and report what I already have.     At least, until the VA gets a revised list from the DOD.     I do not feel comfortable with "just reporting" the matter myself.     In fact, whether your disability claim is up for appeal or initial filing, submit the extract pages with your claim until the VA gets the message:   herbicides were used in Thailand (extensively.)

DOD Fax     Word Doc (38K)     VA Site Official DOD List   Conclusion

In an effort to neutralize the hostilities, I engaged in small talk with the clerk; answered trivial questions regarding my assignments and told him that I would fax a follow-up with all the details and Pentagon contact involved in the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request.     FYI, until 25 Oct 07, the balance of the classified report is still pending release or at least, notification that AFOSI (Office of Special Investigations) after three (3) reviews does not intend to de-classify any more at the fifth review anniversary (every 7 years, in the air force, classified documents come up for an automatic review.)     The review is being conducted by the "SEA Declassification & Review Team" at the Pentagon, Sara MacLeod, FOIA Manager.
 
Continued ..

5 Months since giving notice

    It seems that the VA and the DOD are plagued with incompetent staffing (and contractors) administering some key documents that affect veterans claims from the Vietnam Era.     5 months ago (11 Oct 07) when I spoke with a DOD contractor; notifying them of the list location updates, I was told that the published list has not been changed for some 4 years.     Now, I don't know how long it would take a contractor to pick up the phone and verify the source of the classified report at the Pentagon, a neighbor, but it sure doesn't look good for taking care of business.

    This (harsh) criticism is not isolated with this contractor, his supervisors, or the DOD and VA only, from personal experience in making written inquiries to the VA/Reno RO, I can assure you the same results:   no response.     I was beginning to wonder why the new law VCAA/2000 reforming the way the VA provides notifications was a necessity to put in writing and now I know, incompetency.

    For those that may not be familiar with this so-called (sacred) DOD List, here are the existing two entries of which leave Thailand veterans in formal discovery hanging out to dry (and be denied.)


Agents Orange, Blue .. or, Agents Orange, Purple -- which is it?

Evidently, the one (1) test incidents in Thailand and documenting it was "misspoke," like Hillary.     But, tell the truth:   was it Blue or Purple, or both???     Yes, we know [the DOD] claim only Pranburi, and not -- Satahip (U-Tapao,) Korat, Udorn, Ubon, NKP, Takli, etc., etc.     And, of course, "[not] near U.S. personnel."     Heavens no!     That would be a big lie!     Or, cover-up ...     Now, that we know the truth, at least, about the air force use of herbicides from 1968 to 1972 (1961-67, during construction, no claims to spraying during construction .. it just miraculously happened .. yeah, and I've got a bridge near Bullhead City, Arizona with the bid up to $250,000...) we need the army to come clean!     See Army Disgrace.

In light of the outrageous claims and statements made by agency personnel in the past regarding the "use of herbicides was never near U.S. personnel," it will be interesting just how significant the fall-out will be before it is over.     In my humble opinion, it can never be enough for all those over the past few decades that were denied disability compensation for service connection including the widows of deceased veterans.

Proposed Thailand Locations based upon the USAF CHECO Report "Base Defense in Thailand"

Army/Air Force Military Installation Proximity Chart
Area	AF Base	Army Base       "Vintage 1967"
Satahip	U-Tapao	Camp Samae San, Deep Water Port, Vayama Map
Kanchanaburi	Thai Army	Testimony from Dick Okland Vietnam/Thai Vet
Central	Takhli	Lop Buri Special Forces
Central	Korat	Camp Friendship, USARTHAI
Northeast	Udorn/NKP	Camp Ruam Chit Chai, Sakon Nakon, Camp Sinthope Sarakham, ASA, CIA 7th RRFS Unit   Camp   (20 km south) *
* Udorn RTAFB would have been a source of supplies and BX for the 7th RRFS.
Cambodia	Ubon	ASA, eg, Camp Mukdahan

Notice:   until our FOIA request for Embassy ROE information is returned (probably by 2009,) we can not conclude that Don Muang RTAFB, MAAG facilities in Bangkok were subject to regular herbicide defoliation(s).     In so much as the JUSGMACTHAI Policy memo eludes to:   political needs versus strategic military needs for a metropolitan area such as Bangkok may result in major lawsuits and financial liability by both the Thai government * as well as its American allies.

* Laotian government may become a victim to state treasury; Lao Star (Satellite TV) ran a news story about the "epidemic proportion" of diabetes type II in their country and potential medical and financial consequences.     Camodia and Burma could very well be added to any liability list except for the state of their communist government and lack of rights for their citizens.

Herbicides Use in Thailand (Cronological Survey)

    It is important to document this information because both the VA and the DOD dispute, without foundation I might add, everything that follows the two tests conducted SSW of Bangkok in 1964 and 1965.     As you are about to learn, it was not the end, but only the beginning.

Document Source:   Office of Air Force History (Buckingham)   re:   Ranch Hand

re:   concerning the delegation of authority to approve future defoliation operations

Page 66 and 67: The author describes the Secretary's first efforts to delegate the use of herbicides. "Secretary McNamara's primary thrust in November 16, 1962, was to delegate jointly to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV…" "The general authority was approved by President Kennedy on November 30, 1962, but was limited to clearing roadsides, power lines, railroads, and other lines of communications, and the areas adjacent to depots, airfields, and other field installations." ¹

A test was conducted in Thailand according to the Scientific Advisory Group Working Paper No. 10 - 68, "A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam", authored by William F. Warren, and approved by Roy F. Linsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Advisory Group which stretched through 1965. This segment was also included in the Alvin Young collection, dated January 1966, in a declassified report "Vegetation Analysis of Pranburi Defoliation Test Area I, 66-007, from the Defense Documentation Center, Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia. The authors, Captain John W. Kelly Jr., USA and Amnuay Kaosingha indicate the page was added by Alvin Young and documents both the 1964 and 1965 tests. While these tests were conducted approximately 100 miles SSW of Bangkok, Thailand, the tests mark the beginning of herbicides in Thailand.

Page 15: F. Thailand Tests 1964 - 1965: "A test program was conducted in Thailand 1964 and 1965 to determine the effectiveness of aerial applications of Purple, Orange, and other candidate chemical agents in defoliation of upland jungle vegetation representative of Southeast Asia on duplicate 10-acre plots. Area spray treatments were applied at rates of 0.5 to 3.0 gallons per acre on two test sites representing tropical dry evergreen forest and secondary forest and shrub vegetation. Applications were repeated in alternate 2- to 3-month periods to determine minimal effective rates and proper season of application." ²

Additionally, the well documented work of Paul Frederick Cecil identifies sorties flown from four Thai Air Bases by Ranch Hand aircraft against targets in Laos. The author excerpts include Ranch Hand sorties flown against Laos from NKP and Takhli in 1966, Ranch Hand C-123s often visiting Clark AB, Philippines, mission sorties against Laos in November 1968 from Udorn, from Ubon in January 1969, and again from Udorn in August 1969, permission was given to use herbicides on base perimeters in Thailand with Embassy permission in 1969, aircraft were flown to CCK, Taiwan for maintenance (1966 - 1970) and Kadena AB, Okinawa in 1970 for corrosion control caused by insecticides. As the mission in Vietnam wound down (circa 1972) due to the negotiated peace treaty, supplies of herbicides became available for defoliation of U-Tapao and Korat in June 1972.

Page 87: The Chapter "Flight To Squadron: More Planes, More Hits, More Problems" identifies that in 1966, after five years in Vietnam, "In February the Laos defoliation project spread north of the 17th parallel, to expose segments of the infiltration route along the North Vietnam/Laotian border. Some sorties on the northern sections of the trail were flown out of American bases * at Nakon Phenom and Taklai, Thailand, with the concurrence of the Thai and Laotian governments."

* All military bases in Thailand were never referred to as "American," but "Thai," eg, Royal Thai Air Force Base, or Thai Army Base; same for Navy installations.     This understanding may have to do with soveriegnty and country pride and we were always "guests."

Page 90: In the same chapter the author quotes a flightline controller, "'…scrounged (stoled[,] begged and borrowed] any and every thing we could find on base…'. Hence the stripped frame parked in the Ranch Hand area, of a Case tractor which had disappeared from the ramp at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines at the same time a RANCH HAND aircraft transited the base." ¹⁴

Page 97: Additionally it is noted in the chapter the following, "Although mangroves were highly susceptible to Orange herbicide, by November it was evident that the reduced rate was ineffective, confirming data from the previous test in Thailand." ²⁸

Page 156: The Chapter "New and Old: K Models and Airlift Duty" identifies a November 1968 mission to Udorn, Thailand. "On November 11, Colonel Larsen returned to Udorn with four UC-123Ks. For the next four days the spray planes attacked various targets in the Laotian complex."

Page 158: Finally, in the same chapter the author in documenting the obsolescence of the airframe notes a 1969 mission: "In addition to continuing attacks throughout South Vietnam, on 17 January seven spray planes flew to Ubon, Thailand, to attack a target in Laos the following day. The mission was uneventful, and the planes returned to Vietnam without being hit." ⁵

There is much information highlighted in Mr. Buckingham's Ranch Hand document which details chronological changes in the approval process, certain approvals, and the workings of the approval process; however, my focus is on the phase out of Ranch Hand and the subsequent approval of the use of herbicides in the following excerpt from Pages 172, 174, 179 and 183.

"In early December 1970, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams decided, on the basis of a report prepared by their staffs in Saigon, to completely phase out the crop destruction program. General Abrams stopped any further procurement of white and blue herbicides. The herbicide stocks on hand in South Vietnam were adequate to defoliate base perimeters and to carry out highly selective crop destruction missions until about May 1971." **

** Interesting, my other sources indicate the last spraying in Vietnam was conducted on 7 Jan 71 and not thru May.     Therefore, dates (and undoubtedly locations) should be interpreted with a degree of flexibility.

"Laird said that during this phase-out period, herbicide use would be restricted to remote, unpopulated areas and the vicinities of firebases and U.S. installations…" ***

*** Obviously, accountability for locations and dates to the firebase or "U.S. installation" level was not recorded.

'With the May 1, 1971, date approaching and American forces still in South" Vietnam, American commanders sought to have the deadline for herbicide use extended. In April, General Abrams informed his forces that unless further authorization came in time, they were to stop all use of herbicides by May 1.     The Joint Chiefs asked for continuing authority to spray base perimeters with herbicides blue and white.     On April 28, Ambassador Bunker concurred with this request, noting that there was no satisfactory substitute for herbicides on base perimeters seeded with mines and trip flares.' ³

'On May 13, 1971, Laird asked the President to extend the date for herbicide use by U. S. forces to December 1, or until South Vietnamese could take over the job…'. ³

'…Rogers said that if, however, Nixon felt that military considerations outweighed these political drawbacks, he should not extend the deadline beyond December 1 and should restrict herbicides to base perimeters only, excluding fields of fire.' ³

'… They concluded that herbicides needed to be used beyond the December 1 deadline. The most difficult problem, as before, was finding an alternative to herbicides for removing vegetation around mines, booby traps, and barbed wire.' ⁴

'President Nixon reached a decision on the intertwined issues of continuing herbicide use and Vietnamization on November 26. He acceded to the Defense Department's request on the former and, without a future expiration date, authorized American forces to spray herbicides from ground equipment or helicopters, subject to controls applicable in the United States, around bases where mines, booby traps, or wire ruled out other methods.' ⁵

The "Corona Harvest" Special Report confirms lagging documentation of changing authorities for use of herbicides on August 23, 1968.

The preceding information confirms the use of herbicides on base perimeters without an expiration date and the establishment of approval procedures documented in "The CHECO Report: Base Defense in Thailand", February 18, 1973. ⁶

This same authority and approval procedures are evidenced in the request for herbicides after sapper attacks at four bases in Thailand between 1968 and 1972.     The need for the use of herbicides is evident also.

re:   CHECO "Base Defense in Thailand"

Page 58:   The author documents the need. "To further aid in observation, herbicides were employed to assist in the difficult task of vegetation control. Use of these agents was limited by such factors as the ROE and supply problems."

Page 64 and 65: Again the problem of vegetation is documented:

Limitations

"Contiguous population centers at many of the bases severely limited opportunities for both observation and effective counterfire. Further, tropical vegetation aided by seasonal monsoon rains grew almost faster than it could be controlled.     Dense jungles were rated as the greatest threat to the defenses at U-Tapao. ¹³⁷     ...The extent to which vegetation has been cleared is graphically illustrated in the case of NKP.     \ The photograph of that base on the following page shows the extent of vegetation inside the base perimeters in the early days of construction when the airfield was carved out of virgin jungle.     An interesting comparison between NKP 1966 and NKP 1972 can be made by reference to the picture of that base that appears earlier in this report (See Figure 6.)"

References:

1.     Scientific Advisory Group Working Paper No. 10-68, "A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam", Date: August, 1968, by William F. Warren, approved by Roy F. Linsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Advisory Group.

2.     FOIA Case 07 - 066: CHECO Report "Base Defense in Thailand 1968 - 1972", Date: February 18, 1973, by Major Barnette and Captain Barrow, USAF

3.     "Ranch Hand: Air Force Herbicides in Southeast Asia," Date: May 1984, by Paul Frederick Cecil, Doctoral Dissertation to Texas A&M, and

4.    "Herbicide Warfare: The RANCH HAND Project in Vietnam," © 1986 by Paul Frederick Cecil, published by Praiger Publishing.

Footnotes;   Report Table of Contents